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Abstract   
This article opens with a review of the main trends in family-related behaviour, i.e. 
fertility  decline  and  changes  in  fertility  patterns,  a  decreasing  propensity  to  marry, 
postponement  of  marriage,  and  a  slowly  increasing  frequency  of  divorces  and 
separations. The analysis takes into account urban and rural differences. We then aim to 
identify  the  main  determinants  of  family  changes  within  the  general  conceptual 
framework of the Second Democratic Transition (SDT) in Poland. However, contrary to 
mainstream  interpretations  of  the  SDT,  the  main  emphasis  of  this  study  is  on  the 
structural  components  of  change,  which  need  to  be  reformulated  to  account  for 
processes specific to the transition to a market economy. The focus is, therefore, on 
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1. Introduction  
Family-related behaviour observed in Poland since the 1990s differs remarkably from 
the behaviour observed up to 1989. To demonstrate how specific recent developments 
are,  we  will  refer  to  trends  of  previous  decades.  Moreover,  due  to  the  notable 
dissimilarity of  fertility patterns and their changes between  urban and rural regions 
special attention is devoted to their comparison 
Fertility in Poland is strongly related to marriage; therefore declining nuptiality 
and  postponement  of  starting  a  family  contribute  remarkably  to  fertility  decline. 
However,  developments  in  out-of-wedlock  births,  especially  since  2000,  seem  to 
indicate that this relation is gradually weakening, particularly in urban regions.  
This article focuses on a comparison of family-related behaviour in Poland with 
the main trends observed in other countries that have progressed further into the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT). The interpretation uses a conceptual framework that 
refers  to  three  main  components  of  the  modernisation  process:  structure 
(industralisation and development of services, urbanisation and other processes leading 
to the development of post-industrial society and the welfare state), culture (political 
and global changes, leading to the development of democracy and changes in values 
and  norms),  and  technology  (contraception,  medicine,  telecommunications,  with  the 
spread  of  information  via  television)  (see,  for  example,  van  de  Kaa  1994).  In 
explanations of marital and procreative behaviour within the frame of the SDT, the 
main emphasis is usually placed on culture and technology. In our opinion, structural 
processes are intrinsically important for ideational change and technological advantage. 
Economic  developments,  the  rising  standard  of  living,  the  growing  employment  of 
women, and the development of the welfare state are associated with higher educational 
attainment  and  an  increasing  social  and  spatial  mobility  of  the  population.  Taken 
together,  these  factors  influence  people’s  capability  to  benefit  increasingly  from 
technological progress and to support ideational change.  
The objective of this article is to describe the main changes in family formation 
processes in Poland and to explore their possible determinants. The main focus is on the 
years 1989 to 2004/2005, with references to the period before 1989. In this discussion 
of trends, we refer to the SDT and, more precisely, to its three components (structure, 
culture, and technology). The structural component receives special attention in our 
proposed interpretation and explanation of family changes in Poland. This is because 
we consider the transformation of the economic and political system to be the main 
factor  initiating  deep  shifts  in  the  distribution  of  income,  radical  changes  to  the 
conditions of labour-market participation, and institutional adjustments to the political 
system,  economic  stability  and  organisation  of  the  state  and  society.  The  resulting 
fundamental economic and social changes have, in turn, influenced the perception of Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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the preferences and constraints of individuals and groups. In examining trends, we also 
look at the differences between urban and rural populations. The urban-rural analysis is 
important for two reasons. First, the family-related behaviours and their changes over 
time differ between urban and rural populations; at the beginning of the 1990s these 
differences still existed. It seems, however, that family-related behaviour in rural areas 
follows  the  behaviour  observed  in  urban  areas.  Second,  the  rural  population  still 
accounts for a substantial share of the Polish population.  
The main data used in the study include the following: 
￿  vital statistics, economic statistics, and labour force survey data (LFS); 
￿  results of analyses based on three basic data sources
5: 
o  international data prepared under the DIALOG Project (PPAS data);  
o  data from the representative survey ‘Reconciling work, family, and 
education’, carried out in May 2005 on the LFS sub-sample; 
o  data  from  the  representative  survey  ‘Reconciliation  of  work  and 
family’ recommended by Eurostat as a module to the LFS; 
￿   relevant findings of research in the field, including: 
o  the retrospective survey ‘Family-related attitudes and behaviours of 
young and medium age females and males in Poland’ carried out in 
2001 (Frątczak, Balicki 2003); and 
o  the survey ‘Changes in reproductive behaviours in Poland and their 
consequences  for  family  and  household  formation  and  dissolution’ 
carried out in 2006 (Frątczak et al. 2006). 
Section 2 presents the main trends in family-related behaviour, i.e. fertility decline, 
changes in fertility patterns, the decreasing propensity to marry, the postponement of 
marriage, and the gradually increasing frequency of divorce and separation. Sections 3 
and 4 address the main determinants of childbearing trends with a focus on the labour 
market, family policy, and ideational change. In Section 5 we discuss policy measures 
                                                            
5 The DIALOG Project, ‘Population policy acceptance study – the viewpoint of citizens and policy actors 
regarding the management of population related change’, funded by the European Commission for three years 
(January 2003 to December 2005), was coordinated by the Federal Institute for Population Research in 
Wiesbaden, Germany. Demographic change and population-related policies were analysed by demographers 
from 15 European countries using the international database composed from data of the national surveys 
carried out in the years 2000–2003 (Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Hungary, 
Finland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia). In Poland the survey 
was run in November 2001 on a sample of 4,505 individuals aged 18–64. The representative surveys 
‘Reconciliation of work and family’ (N=37,849 aged 15–64) and ‘Reconciling work, family and education’ 
(N=5,564 aged 18–64)  were carried out in May 2005. The first one was conducted on the full LFS sample on 
the recommendation of Eurostat. The second one was designed in order to collect more detailed data on 
reconciliation issues and was carried out only on a random LFS sub-sample.  Hence the respondents who 
participated in the survey ‘Reconciling work, family and education’ were also covered by LFS and Eurostat’s 
module. Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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that are supportive to reversing the downward fertility trend. In the final section (6) we 
offer some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Family changes in Poland  
In most general terms, during the last four decades family-related changes in Europe 
have  been  demonstrated  through  a  decreasing  propensity  to  marry,  marriage  and 
childbearing postponement, and even an increase in the decisions not to have children at 
all. The growing frequency of divorce and separation as well as the rising popularity of 
cohabitations and LAT relationships (living-apart-together) indicate that marriage has 
lost  its  instrumental  significance  in  forming  a  family.  These  behaviours  have 
contributed to the drop in fertility and shifts in fertility patterns: The decision to have a 
first child has been postponed and the number of extra-marital births has been rising. 
The depth and permanence of these changes has brought period fertility to a point well 
below the level that guarantees replacement of generations. The trend has also been 
observed in cohort fertility, though it has not been so pronounced.  
 
 
2.1 Fertility  
2.1.1 Trends in period fertility  
One of the most distinctive features of demographic developments in Poland since 1989 
has been a rapid decline in births. The overall number of births has dropped by 37%, 
from 564,400 in 1989 to 352,785 in 2003 (see Figure 1). Recent data seem to indicate 
that in urban areas the downward trend has come to a halt. As a result, a slight increase 
to 357,900 in 2004 and to 364,400 in 2005 was observed. 
The overall decline is manifested as a continuation of the downward trend since 
1983, the last year of the period of rising births related to the baby boom generation 
entering the most fertile ages. However, it is notable that the recent declines occurred 
despite  the  fact  that  numerous  cohorts  of  women  born  between  1970  and  1979  (a 
consequence of the post-war baby boom) entered the age of the highest marital and 
procreative activity (20–29). The number of women aged 20–24 increased steadily, and 
the proportion of women aged 15–49 rose from 12.8% in 1989 to 16.4% in 2004. The 
share of women aged 25–29 declined slightly, from 1989 (14.4%) to 1994 (12%), and 
then  increased  markedly  in  the  next  decade  (to  15.2%  in  2004).  Altogether,  the 
proportion of women aged 20–29 rose from 27.2% in 1989 to 31.6% in 2004.  
 Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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Source: CSO data. 
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Intensive decrease in the TFR and the postponement of childbearing, observed in 
the 1990s constitute a new stage in the trend of long-term fertility decline in Poland. 
The TFR dropped from 2.07 in 1989 to 1.22 children in 2003 (1.23 in 2004 and 1.24 in 
2005; see Figure 2). Within the 15-year period Poland moved from the group of high-
fertility countries to the group of lowest-low fertility. 
The significant fall in the number of children born to women in the first (20–24) 
and second (25–29) most fertile age groups shaped the shifts in fertility patterns by age. 
Since 1998 highest fertility has moved to the 25–29 age group (see Figure 3). Recent 
years showed a slight increase in the fertility of women aged 25–34.   
The total contribution to the TFR of the age groups 20–34 did not change during 
the years 1989–2003 and accounted for 84% of the TFR. However, remarkable shifts 
occurred between particular ages: In 1989 the fertility of women aged 20–24, 25–29, 
and 30–34 accounted for 40%, 30%, and 14% of the TFR respectively, while in 2004 
these figures were 25%, 36%, and 23%.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Age-specific fertility rates (per 1000 of women), Poland,  






























































Source: CSO data. 
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Both fertility levels and patterns differed between urban and rural populations (see 
Figures 4 and 5). Fertility behaviour of urban women underwent more radical changes 
than the behaviour of rural women in the 1950–1970 period, especially in the 1950s. 
From 1963 fertility in urban regions remained below replacement level. It was only due 
to the high number of children in the rural population, which constituted the steadily 
declining share of Poland’s population until the 1990s, that overall fertility remained 
above replacement until 1988. The different pace of fertility changes in both regions 
resulted  in  increasing  differences  between  the  TFR  values  until  1970  and  visibly 
different fertility patterns by age. The TFR in urban areas declined from 3.23 in 1950 to 
1.7  in  1970,  while  that  of  rural  regions  fell  from  4.03  to  2.88.  Subsequently,  the 
difference narrowed slightly to around 0.7 in 1989.  
Under  the  recent  transformation,  the  timing  and  intensity  of  fertility  changes 
differed between the urban and rural populations; however, together they resulted in 
 
 
Figure 4:  Age-specific fertility rates (per 1000 women), Poland – urban areas,  
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declining regional differences in terms of TFR values and fertility patterns by age. In 
total, the TFR in urban areas declined from 1.82 in 1989 to 1.11 in 2003. The rise 
started in 2004 (to 1.12 in 2004 and 1.15 in 2005). For rural areas a steady decline from 
2.51 to 1.40 in 2004 was observed. From 1997 onward, urban women aged 25–29 have 
had the highest fertility; since 2000 the fertility of those aged 30–34 has been rising. In 
rural regions the maximum fertility shifted to the age group 25–29 in 2001. One can 
conclude that age-specific fertility changes of rural women followed patterns observed 
earlier in urban regions. Still, further transformations in age patterns can be expected.  
The  observed  change  of  fertility  reflects  quantum  as  well  as  tempo  effects. 
Analyses based on the Bongaarts-Feeney formula (Bongaarts, Feeney 1998) indicated 
that postponing the decision to have children had a significant role in the drop of the 
TFR  in  the  1990s  (see  Frątczak  and  Ptak-Chmielewska  1999,  Frątczak  2003).  By 
decomposing the birth decline into tempo, quantum, and age structure effects, Sobotka, 
Lutz, and Philipov (2005) showed that fertility postponement contributed markedly to 
that trend, but in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s (until 2003) the 
fertility quantum played the main role.  
 
 
Figure 5:  Age-specific fertility rates (per 1000 women), Poland – rural areas,  
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The postponement of parenthood is reflected in the rising mean age at motherhood 
from 26.3 in 1989 to 27.3 years in 2003. The mean age at first birth has increased even 
more, from 23.3 in 1989 to 25.6 years in 2005. Delays in the transition to parenthood 
were more evident among urban women – the mean age at first birth given by urban 
women increased to 26.1 years in 2005 while that of rural women was 24.6 years. The 
indicators are, however, still relatively low compared to other European countries. 
Childbearing intensities, as specified by the age and parity-specific fertility index, 
based  on  life-table  computations  (PATFR,  see  e.g.,  Rallu  and  Toulemon  1994), 
declined for each birth order. The decline was stronger for higher-order births (Figure 
6). While first-birth intensity fell from 0.89 in 1988 to 0.69 in 2003 (i.e. by 23%), 
second-birth intensity declined from 0.7 to 0.4 (i.e. by 43%), and the intensity for third-
birth order decreased from 0.32 to 0.10 (i.e. by 70%). As a result, first births constituted 
51% of live births in 2005 (55% and 46% in urban and rural regions, respectively), 
which was 13 percentage points more than in 1989. The share of first and second births 
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Sources: Bolesławski 1993, Demographic Yearbook 1989–2003, computations by T. Sobotka.  
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Analyses of conditional first-birth probabilities, computed for women remaining 
childless at the beginning of a given age interval, show that it was mainly the younger 
women (aged 25 or below) who contributed to the fall in first birth intensity (Figure 7). 
In 2003 the probability of having the first child before age 25 was less than half of that 
in 1989. Until the mid-1990s a fall in first birth intensities was also observed for older 
women.  Since  1995,  the  conditional  first  birth  probability,  computed  for  women 
remaining childless at the beginning of a given age interval, stabilized at around 0.4 for 
women aged 25–30 (0.5 in 1989), 0.2 for women aged 30–35 (0.26 in 1989), and 0.1 
for women aged 35 and above (0.15 in 1989). Recently, a slight increase in first birth 
intensities has been observed for women aged 30–35, which may indicate a tendency 
toward recuperation of postponed motherhood.  
 
 
Figure 7:   Conditional probability of having a first child at selected age  
  intervals among women who were childless at the beginning  
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Sources: Bolesławski 1993, Demographic Yearbook 1989–2003, computations by T. Sobotka. 
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2.1.2 Completed fertility and parity distribution  
Although  the  period  fertility  measures  presented  in  the  previous  subsection  show  a 
remarkable decline in fertility, the decrease may partly be a period phenomenon caused 
by  fertility  postponement.  Indeed,  the  Kohler-Ortega  (2002)  adjusted  total  fertility 
index (adjPATFR) shows that if the shift of childbearing to higher ages had been taken 
into account, fertility would have been higher by 0.2–0.3 children per woman for the 
whole period after 1993. This would mean a total fertility of 1.54 in 2002, as indicated 
by adjPATFR, which is, however, still low and represents a considerable decline when 
compared to 1990, when the adjPATFR was 2.08.  
 
 
Figure 8:  Period (1950–2004) and cohort (1930–1966) total fertility rates,  






































Sources: Council of Europe 2006, AdjPATFR computed by T. Sobotka from the data of Eurostat (2006) and Bolesławski (1993). 
NOTE: The Adjusted PATFR index was computed according to the formula proposed by Kohler and Ortega (2002) for first and 
second births. It is constructed from the schedule age and parity-specific birth probabilities, which are adjusted to remove 
distortions caused by changes in the timing of childbearing. The (unadjusted) TFRs were used for third and higher birth orders.  
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Focusing only on women who reached the upper limits of their reproductive life, 
one can see that the cohorts born before 1966 gave birth to more than two children on 
average. After a gradual decline from the level of 2.78 for the cohort born in 1930, the 
completed total fertility stabilized at around 2.17–2.20 for women born in 1949–1959. 
Then,  a  further  decline  was  observed,  and  the  cohort  total  fertility  dropped  below 
replacement for women born after 1966.  
The gradual decrease in the fertility of cohorts born after 1938 was linked to the 
steady  decrease  in  fertility  at  fourth  and  higher  birth  order.  This  decline  was  most 
pronounced for cohorts born in 1938–1946. It stopped for women born in the 1953–
1959 period, i.e. those  who  entered their  most reproductive ages in the 1970s, and 
continued again among the youngest cohorts. At the cost of fourth and higher parities, 
initially  a  constant  increase  in  the  proportion  of  women  with  two  children  was 
observed. Among women born in the 1950s, around 40% gave birth to two children. 
For younger cohorts, however, a decline in the proportion of two-child families was 
 
 











































































childless one child two children three children four children or more
 
 
Sources: Observatoire Démographique Européen and computations by T. Sobotka from the data of Eurostat (2006) and Bolesławski 
(1993). 
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observed. Nevertheless, among women who completed their reproductive careers, the 
proportion of mothers with two children is still the highest and the progression rate to 
the second child has remained stable, around 0.8 (see Figures 9 and 10).  
The fall in the number of two-child families has been accompanied by a drop in 
the proportion of women with three or more children. In parallel, a sudden increase in 
childlessness has been noted. Among women born in 1966, the childless account for 
15% (for those born in 1938 it was 6.9%). The steep rise in childlessness was more 
pronounced than the increase in the proportion of one-child families.  
 
 























































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen and computations by T. Sobotka from the data of Eurostat (2006) and Bolesławski 
(1993). 
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The comparative analyses of cohort data by birth order by Frejka and Sardon show 
that the proportion of women born in 1965 who gave birth to their first child in Poland 
(0.845) was the lowest among  the  CEE countries.  According to the latest available 
estimates  for  the  1971  birth  cohort,  Poland  remains  at  the  same  position,  with  the 
proportion  declining  to  0.802  (Frejka  and  Sardon  2006a,  Table  1,  p.152).
6  The 
proportion  of  women  born  in  the  1960s  who  delivered  a  second  child  was  about 
average, while the share of those who gave birth to the third child declined more than 
average (Frejka and Sardon 2006b, Figures 2 and 3, pp. 23–24). 
Up to this point we have described the trends for women who already completed 
their  fertility  histories.  The  main  changes  in  childbearing  trends,  however,  have 
occurred among women born after 1966. At the time of the economic transformation in 
Poland they were still in the middle of their reproductive years. Figures 11a–c present 
the childbearing patterns for this group of women as regards first and second order 
births.   
A  substantial  decline  in  the  progression  to  first  and  second  birth  for  each 
subsequent cohort can easily be seen at  younger ages.  For example, by age 28 the 
progression rate to first birth was reduced by 0.1 for women born in 1970 and by 0.2 for 
those born in 1975, when compared with women born in 1960 (Fig 11c–1). Progression 
to second birth at this age declined even more markedly, by 0.14 for the 1970 cohort 
and by 0.29 for the 1975 cohort (Fig. 11c–2). Nevertheless,  some  signs of  fertility 
postponement are also noticeable. Frejka and Sardon estimated that the cohort mean age 
at first birth would increase from 23.3 for the 1960s birth cohorts to 23.9 among women 
born in 1972 (Frejka and Sardon 2006a, Table 2, p.156). 
 
 
                                                            
6 The cohort fertility rates computed by Frejka and Sardon (2006a) for the youngest cohort, who have not 
completed their reproductive careers yet are based on estimates. The yet unknown age-specific fertility rates 
are assumed to be equal to those of the youngest cohort for which the data are available.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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Figure 11:  Transition to first and second birth by age among women born in  
  1960–1980  
 
a:  Number of live births of first and second order per woman, by age  
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b:  Cumulative progression rate to first and second birth  
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c:  Cumulative change in first and second birth progression rate by age  
  (benchmark cohort 1960)  
 






















































































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen. 
 
 
 Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
812    http://www.demographic-research.org 
2.1.3 Fertility intentions  
According to the Family and Fertility Survey (FFS) results,  the average number of 
expected children in 1991 was 2.2 among females and 2.0 among males (Holzer and 
Kowalska 1997). For the youngest cohort (20–29) the average number of ultimately 
expected children was much lower: 1.7.  
Furthermore,  the  data  from  the  Population  Policy  Acceptance  Survey  (PPAS) 
shows  that  in  2001  Poland  recorded  the  lowest  intended  fertility  among  childless 
people
7. The average number of children expected by childless respondents aged 20–40 
was very low (1.05) and comparable with the low values found for Germany (Esveldt 
and Fokkema 2005). The same indicator for childless Poles aged 20–29 was the lowest 
among the PPAS countries (1.18).  
What  distinguished  Poland  among  the  PPAS  countries  was  a  high  level  of 
uncertainty about fertility intentions among childless people – 33% of women and 40% 
of men were undecided in that respect. Only Finland returned similar figures (Fokkema 
and Esveldt 2005). Again, the reconciliation survey data of 2005 showed a high level of 
uncertainty among childless respondents - one third of childless respondents aged 18–
39 were undecided.  
The survey ‘Changes in reproductive behaviours in Poland and their consequences 
for  family  and  household  formation  and  dissolution’  carried  out  for  the  urban 
population in 2006 showed that the average number of children expected for the young 
cohort (below 30) was around 1.5. At the same time, the proportion of respondents who 
planned to have two children increased compared to 2001, as did the proportion of 
those  who  intended  to  remain  childless  –  a  finding  that  seems  to  be  a  sign  of  the 
polarisation of attitudes towards parenthood (Jóźwiak 2006).  
Poland reported the highest proportion of childless women of the 1960s and early 
1970s  birth  cohorts  among  the  CEE  countries.  However,  different  sources  of  data 
indicate a relatively low level of intended childlessness compared to other European 
countries. For example, the study by Sobotka and Testa (forthcoming) on the PPAS 
data shows that that 8.5% of childless women aged 18–39 and 13.5% of childless men 
at that age declared that they intend to stay childless. These figures situated Polish 
women in the group of rather low intended childlessness, while Polish men belonged to 
the  group  with  a  moderate  level  of  intended  childlessness  (Sobotka  and  Testa, 
forthcoming).
8  
                                                            
7 The Population Policy Acceptance Survey was conducted in the years 2000-2003 in 14 European countries: 
Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Finland, the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. 
8 Other studies also revealed the low childlessness intentions of Poles, which are stronger for men than for 
women (Billari 2005, the 2005 survey ‘Reconciling work, family, and education’). Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
http://www.demographic-research.org   813 
Results of the Eurobarometer survey of 2006 confirm the low level of intended 
childlessness: Among childless Poles aged 15–39, only 1.6% of women and 3.4% of 
men declared a preference to remain childless (Testa 2006). Moreover, Poland belongs 
to the group of countries with the lowest intended childlessness and with high intentions 
to have at least one child. This can be partly attributed to growing fertility intentions, 
which is also illustrated by the results of two sample surveys carried out in Poland in 
2006 (Jóźwiak 2006, Kotowska and Baranowska 2006).
9  
The PPAS data enable us to evaluate population attitudes towards childlessness. 
Some 65% of respondents disapproved of the increasing number of childless couples 
(i.e.  the  trend  received  negative  and  very  negative  assessments),  situating  Poland 
slightly above the mean level (nearly 63%) for the participating countries. Polish men 
and women below age 34 and single persons expressed markedly less disapproval of 
rising childlessness (Kotowska et al. 2003).  
The low fertility intentions among childless people and the high uncertainty about 
the fertility intentions of childless respondents along with postponed fertility decisions 
may result in increasing childlessness in Poland, and this despite the fact that intended 
childlessness is low and despite the relatively low approval of  rising childlessness.  
 
 
2.1.4 Out-of wedlock births  
The data for the early 1990s shows a new trend – a systematic rise in out-of-wedlock 
births. The number increased systematically from 32,700 in 1989 to 67,239 in 2005. 
The percentage of out-of-wedlock births, which remained stable at around 5% during 
the years 1960–1990, increased from 5.8 to 18.5%, and did so more markedly in urban 
regions (see Figure 12). From 2000 the rise accelerated: 14.8 and 21.6% of children 
were born out-of-wedlock in urban regions in 2000 and 2005, respectively. In rural 
areas the percentage rose from 8.8 to 14.4.
10 Despite the fact that the figures are still 
                                                            
9 The proportion of women aged 25–39 intending to have at least one child was 86% (the highest among the 
countries under study, the EU average was 66%), of whom 75% planned to have a child in the next three 
years (the EU average was 43%) and 67% were sure of being successful (37% at the EU level). For males, 
these indicators were lower: 81% of men aged 25–39 declared the intention to have at least one child (a 
relatively high level, the EU average being 66%) and among them 41% planned to have a child in the next 
three years (the EU average was 35%) while 60% were sure of being successful (46% at the EU level). 
10 This indicator, which combines both fertility- and nuptiality-related changes, is strongly diversified across 
regions (voivodships). In the years 1995–2004 its values became more diverse, especially in rural regions, 
proving ongoing polarisation of relevant behaviour. The general picture remained, however, roughly stable: 
i.e., lower extramarital births in the south-eastern regions and remarkably higher in the western regions of 
Poland (Stolarek 2005). Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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moderate by European standards, the change is a distinctive feature of recent fertility 
developments in Poland.  
 
 


























Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO) data.  
 
 
The  detailed  fertility  analysis  of  married  and  unmarried  women  for  the  years 
1989–2000 by Boleslawski (2001) indicate that the observed changes in the number and 
structure of births (marital and extramarital) were intrinsically related to the greater 
decline  in  marital  fertility  (by  17%)  rather  than  in  extramarital  fertility  (by  5%). 
Additionally, an in-depth study into age patterns revealed that extramarital births were 
most  frequent  among  urban  women  aged  30–34  (246  births  per  10,000  unmarried 
women)  and  rural  women  aged  25–34  (253  births  per  10,000  unmarried  women) 
(Stolarek 2005, Szukalski 2001). 
The majority of out-of-wedlock children was born in urban regions (67% in 2005) 
and to never-married mothers, who accounted for 79% of non-marital children in 1990 
and  88%  in  2005.  Moreover,  the  proportion  of  children  born  outside  marriage    to 
women aged 15–19 declined, while that of women aged 20–29 rose (to 62.8% of all 
out-of-wedlock births in 2005). However, among the considerably lower number of Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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births given by women aged 15–19 (see Section 4), the proportion of out-of-wedlock 
births increased from 19.3% in 1989 to 58.2% in 2004. 
Taking these developments into account, one can make the assumption that the 
trend in out-of-wedlock births provides evidence that the shifts in behaviour resulted 
from gradually changing attitudes towards births delivered out-of-wedlock by never-
married women or women in cohabitation, especially among young persons living in 
urban areas. The data from the Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS) in 2001 
shows that the increasing proportion of out-of-wedlock births was disapproved of by 
60% of the respondents; however, single persons, people under 30, and residents of big 
cities showed a higher approval (Kotowska et al. 2003). 
Since marriage disruption by divorce and separation remained low,
11 it seems that 
changes in out-of-wedlock births contributed remarkably to a rise in the proportion of 
one-parent  families.  The  census  data  showed  that  over  the  years  1988–2002  the 
proportion of lone parents among families increased from 15.4% to 19.4% (from 16.8% 
to 21.1% in urban areas and from 13.0% to 16.4% in rural areas).  
 
 
2.2 Union formation and dissolution  
2.2.1 Marriage  
Between  1960  and  1990,  marriage  patterns  by  age  of  females  and  males  remained 
almost  stable,  especially  for  females.  The  highly  right-skewed  curves,  with  a  high 
prevalence  of  marriage  among  persons  aged  20–24,  reflects  the  Eastern  European 
model of family formation based on universal marriages contracted at early ages (see 
Figures  13,  14,  and  15).  The  declining  propensity  to  marry,  along  with  marriage 
postponement, which is characteristic of family formation behaviour under the SDT, are 
manifested by remarkable changes in marriage patterns by age and sex. The marriage 
curves  visibly  flattened.  A  significant  decrease  in  contracted  marriages  was  mostly 
noted in the 20–24 age group for both males and females and the 25–29 age group for 
males.  Additionally,  for  males  the  highest  rate  shifted  to  age  25–29.  Since  1997  a 
gradual increase in the marriage rate for persons of both sexes aged 25–29 has been 
observed, with more marked changes being noted for women. This is accompanied by a 
slight increase in marriages by women aged 30-34 and a more marked increase by men 
aged 30-34 (see Figures 13, 14).  
                                                            
11 Nevertheless, in very recent years an upward tendency in the number of marriages ending in divorce or 
separation has been observed.  Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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Figure 13:  Number of marriages per thousand men of a given age, Poland, 1960– 


















Source: CSO data.  
 
 

















Source: CSO data.  
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A  marked reluctance to  marry, particularly among  women, can be additionally 
illustrated by changes in first marriage patterns. The total first marriage rate of women 
aged up to 50 decreased from 0.91 in 1989 to 0.56 in 2004 (see Figure 15). From 1993 
the total first marriage rate was higher for men than for women. The mean age at first 
marriage increased in the years 1989–2004 from 22.8 to 24.7 for females and from 25.1 
to 26.9 years for males (CSO data). 
 
 
Figure 15:  Total first marriage rate and mean age at first marriage of females 
aged up to 50, Poland, 1970–2004  
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Source: Council of Europe data.  
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2.2.2 Cohabitation  
In  comparison  to  other  countries  in  Europe,  cohabitation  in  Poland  is  relatively 
uncommon. According to the population census of 2002, only 2.2% of persons living in 
unions  participated  in  this  form  of  partnership.  Despite  its  marginal  incidence,  the 
number of consensual unions has been growing continuously since 1978, when 90,000 
consensual unions were recorded (1% of all partnerships), rising to 197,400 in 2002 
(Fihel 2005). The detailed analysis of the census data by Fihel shows an ambiguous and 
differentiated picture of cohabitation in Poland. Some features are of particular interest. 
For instance, cohabitation is practised by various social groups. Moreover, it is related 
to certain stages of the family life cycle: first, those who cohabit most frequently are the 
young (aged 20–29) living in cities who have never been married. Fihel estimated that 
nearly every third consensual union in Poland is a pre-marital cohabitation i.e. both 
partners  were  never  married.  Second,  it  is  relatively  widespread  among  divorced 
persons. In this group post-marital cohabitation seems to have become more popular 
than re-marriage.  
Other findings by Fihel (2005) suggest that cohabitation is considered a temporary, 
unstable living arrangement rather than an alternative to marriage. Among households 
with children, the proportion of households inhabited by consensual couples is only 1.6 
%. At the same time, women who become pregnant out-of-wedlock more frequently 
decide to get married before the child is born rather than to stay unmarried. Although 
this  pattern  changed  somewhat  in  the  1990s,  as  the  rise  in  extra-marital  births 
illustrated, entering a marriage continues to provide the feeling of a secure and stable 
partnership, preferred for parenthood.
12 Moreover, cohabitation may be preferred by 
people without own employment-based sources of income. Cohabitants very frequently 
live on welfare and unemployment benefits. They are typically supported by others, 
perhaps most often their parents. Such sources of income do not guarantee economic 
stability, considered as a precondition to start a family. 
Despite the marginal incidence of cohabitation, one can expect that it will become 
more popular among Poles. Kotowska et al. (2003) found that among different family-
related  developments,  such  as  the  increasing  proportion  of  childless  couples,  the 
                                                            
12 According to the study conducted by Slany (2001) among students, cohabitation was perceived as a 
temporary type of union. The qualitative analyses of meaning, attitudes, and experiences of cohabitation by 
Mynarska and Bernardi (2007), based on interviews of 48 young residents of Warsaw (women between 20 
and 30 years of age, males between 20 and 35 years of age), medium to highly educated, showed that a 
positive perception was attached to cohabitation as a stage of interrelationship before marriage only. 
Additionally, the PPAS data revealed that, despite the gradually changing attitudes towards children born 
outside marriage, having children out-of-wedlock received more disapproval than did living in consensual 
unions (Kotowska et al. 2003). Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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decreasing number of marriages and births, the rising number of one-parent families, 
the rising proportion of out-of-wedlock births, and an  increase in the proportion of 
consensual  unions  received  most  approval.  Generally,  these  developments  were 
perceived  as  negative  by  more  than  half  of  the  respondents,  with  the  exception  of 
cohabitation, which was negatively evaluated by 42% of the respondents. 
 
 
2.2.3 Union dissolution  
Poland belongs to a group of countries with low levels of divorce. The total divorce 
rate, defined as the sum of  divorce rates by duration of  marriage  for a given  year, 
oscillated between 0.13 and 0.18 during the years 1970–1988. The temporary decline 
observed in the years 1989–1993 was followed by an upward trend (see Figure 16). The 
change accelerated in very recent years. The number of divorces, which had oscillated 
between 42,000 and 45,000 in the years 1997–2002, increased to 67,600 in 2005 (the 
total divorce rate rising from 0.16 in 1997 to 0.23 in 2005). Moreover, the option of 
separation (introduced by law in 1999) resulted in the number of marriages dissolved 
rising, from 1,300 in 2000 to 11,600 in 2005. 
Divorces were more frequent among persons living in urban areas. Crude divorce 
rates, defined as the number of divorces per 1000 of population aged 20 or more years, 
oscillated between 1.5 and 2.8 in urban regions and fell below 1.0 in rural areas. Until 
the mid-1990s there was either a decline (in urban regions) or stabilisation (in rural 
regions) of divorce rates (see Figure 17). Changes observed since 1995 illustrate that 
marriage  dissolution  by  divorce  or  separation  has  become  more  frequent  in  both 
regions, while it is still not very widespread.  
Summing up, the major characteristics of changes in family formation observed in 
Poland  over  the  last  15  years  are  declines  in  fertility  and  nuptiality  as  well  as 
postponement of birth and entry into union, similar to developments observed in other 
European countries over the last four decades. Given the infrequency of cohabitation 
and  divorce,  one  can  conclude  that  marriage  still  persists  as  a  relatively  stable 
institution and that it is a prevailing form within which to start a family – features that 
distinguish  Poland  from  other  countries.  However,  there  are  some  signs  that  de-
institutionalisation processes are already in place, especially among people residing in 
urban areas. An acceleration of the upward trend in out-of-wedlock births and increases 
in marriage dissolution since 2000 along with a rise in cohabitation indicate ongoing 
changes in family formation.  Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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Delays  in  marriage  and  parenthood  as  well  as  de-institutionalisation  processes 
were used by Hantrais (2005) to demonstrate country differences in family formation in 
the  EU25.
13  Despite  the  quite  significant  postponement  effects  documented  here, 
Poland  along  with  Hungary,  the  Czech  Republic,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Estonia,  and 
Slovakia still remain at the early stage of transition from conventional family formation 
(early  marriages)  to  delayed  family  formation.  In  terms  of  de-institutionalisation, 
Poland may be clustered with Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Cyprus as countries 
where that process is less advanced compared to other European countries (Hantrais, 
2005: 128–130).  
 
 





























Source: Council of Europe data.  
 
                                                            
13 The following demographic indicators have been used in cross-country comparisons: mean age of females 
at first marriage, mean age at first birth, mean age at childbearing, percentage of extramarital births, and 
divorce rates.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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3. Determinants of childbearing trends in Poland  
3.1 The socio-economic context  
The  economic  reforms  that  started  in  1989  led  to remarkable  changes  in  GDP  and 
employment.  A  steadily  declining  share  of  output  by  agriculture  (3%  in  2004), 
manufacturing, and construction (29%) and a rising share of output by the service sector 
(66%) have been accompanied by considerable shifts in employment composition. In 
2004,  services  made  up  nearly  55%  of  employment;  this  compares  to  28%  in 
manufacturing and construction and 17% in agriculture. The growing private  sector 
generated around 63% of GDP and accounted for 71% of employment. 
Restructuring of the Polish economy resulted in a total decline in jobs by about 3.1 
million between 1990 and 2003. In parallel, the working-age population increased by Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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about 2.2 million. With regard to changes in GDP, employment, and unemployment, 
four phases of economic transformation can be distinguished:  
 
•  In  the  ‘black’  years  of  1990–1993,  GDP  and  employment  declined  drastically 
while massive unemployment set in.  
•  In the period 1994–1998, GDP and employment rose and unemployment declined. 
•  In  the  period  1999–2002,  GDP  growth  slowed,  employment  declined,  and 
unemployment  increased  to  levels  exceeding  the  levels  of  the  early  1990s 
(unemployment reached 20% in 2003). 
•  From 2003, GDP growth accelerated and employment increased (in 2004), this in 
contrast to unemployment, which declined visibly.    
 
The transition to a market economy in Poland imposed economic modernisation 
and  the  reform  of  the  institutional  setting.  Among  many  components  of  the 
transformation processes, two results of institutional changes can be seen as the main 
driving forces behind family-related behaviour (e.g., Kotowska 2004b): 
 
•  The reassignment of economic functions between the state, enterprise, and the 
family. This was fundamentally based on the removal of the state from its role 
as employer and provider of services and of social benefits; the erosion of the 
social  function  of  companies  led  to  an  increase  in  the  responsibility  of 
households for their economic situation at a time  when it  was increasingly 
difficult to obtain income.  
•  Changes in the conditions of labour-market participation, caused by economic 
reforms and (since the mid-1990s) globalisation along with an influx of the 
baby-boomers’  descendants  in  the  1990s  resulted  in  persisting  high 
unemployment pressure. 
 
The first group of processes relates to economic reforms as well as ‘welfare state’ 
reforms, the second relates to changes in the labour market. Their family-relevant main 
effects are: 
 
•  changes in household welfare, 
•  an increasing vulnerability of the family, and 
•  increasing difficulties to reconcile work and family. 
 
The  changes  in  income  distribution  that  took  place  during  the  economic 
transformation (mostly due to labour-market changes) led to an increase in economic 
and  social  inequalities.  Rising  poverty  and  social  stratification  was  combined  with 
social exclusion of specific groups and a decrease in the feeling of social security. The Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
http://www.demographic-research.org   823 
reassignment  of  economic  functions  of  the  state  was  not  accompanied  by  the 
construction  of  effective  markets  and  of  the  system  of  income  transfers,  including 
protection from poverty. Therefore, high economic and social inequalities seem to be 
considered rather as a non-transient effect of the reforms in the CEE countries. Social 
reaction  to  increasing  economic  stratification  may  be  manifested  not  only  through 
demanding attitudes
14 or feelings of relative deprivation, but also through an emphasis 
on economic factors while making significant life decisions, including marriage and 
children.
15 This can be strengthened by increasing consumption aspirations.  
The growing vulnerability of the family is another highly important aspect of the 
changes  in  Poland.  It  is  true  that  the  position  of  the  family  has  been  weakened  in 
countries with developed market economies, but there have been different reasons for 
Poland.  In  developed  economies,  family  development  was  associated  with  the 
development  of  the  welfare  state  through  its  social  security  system,  education,  and 
health services. In Poland, by contrast, the withdrawal of the state from numerous social 
entitlements  for  families  (less  access  to  institutional  childcare,  as  reflected  by  the 
number of places and the costs of childcare, and declining direct and indirect financial 
support  to  families)  made  the  family  more  dependent  on  its  own  resources.  These 
resources  were  strongly  influenced  by  labour-market  changes,  i.e.  increasing 
competition and unemployment.  
These  new  and  (before  1989)  unknown  characteristics  of  the  labour  market 
constitute a threat to the economic well-being of a significant proportion of households. 
Additionally,  the  possibility  of  using  existing  social  entitlements  is  related  to 
employment,  therefore  a  job  loss  also  means  a  loss  of  many  entitlements.  Further, 
women very often forgo their rights to existing entitlements because they are afraid of 
losing their employment position. Consequently, the difficult situation in the labour 
market has an impact on access to family benefits, especially with regard to women. 
Families and households faced situations in which their obligations and responsibilities 
related to their economic situation have increased, while at the same time fulfilling 
these obligations and responsibilities has become much more difficult, mostly due to 
the developments in the labour market (e.g., Kotowska 1999, 2004b; Kocot-Górecka 
2004; Muszyńska 2004; Matysiak 2005b).  
                                                            
14 According to PPAS data, for instance, 62.6% of respondents expected the state to take care of young 
persons looking for a job; 61.4% of respondents claimed that it is the state’s responsibility to provide 
adequate housing for everyone (Kotowska et al. 2003). 
15 Opinions that the state has the responsibility to support families in strict (e.g., financial benefits) and broad 
terms (housing, the labour market, gender equality) are expressed by both the population and experts in the 
field (e.g., Kotowska et al. 2003; Kotowska et al. 2005a). Other survey-based studies confirm how important 
economic reasoning is when it comes to deciding on children (e.g., Frątczak 2003, Frątczak et al. 2006). Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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Transformation processes generally created new career opportunities and related 
changes  to  the  socio-economic  position  of  individuals  and  households.  Household 
welfare  became  more  dependent  on  household  resources,  such  as  personal  income, 
skills, and the ability to act in new circumstances. Simultaneously, growing labour-
market competition resulted in growing job requirements. For these reasons, more effort 
had to be made by individuals to get and to maintain a job. Acquiring appropriate skills 
plays  a  particularly  important  role  here.  Additionally,  the  labour  market  in  Poland 
remains under persistent demographic pressure, generated by the baby boom of the late 
1970s  and  the  early  1980s.
16  The  growing  labour  force  combined  with  insufficient 
demand  for  labour  resulted  in  large  groups  of  people  at  risk  of  unemployment. 
Irrespective  of  the  phases  of  economic  development  during  the  1990–2005  period, 
young  persons  experienced  a  constant  and  very  high  threat  of  unemployment. 
Therefore, to find a job and to stay in the highly competitive labour market became of 
crucial importance for the younger generations. Moreover, unfortunate changes in the 
institutional setting made it more difficult for women to be flexible and mobile and to 
adapt  to  increasing  employers’  requirements.  Many  studies  have  revealed  the 
discrimination of women in the labour-market (e.g., Heinen 1995; Siemieńska 1997; 
Kotowska 1995, 2001; Kowalska, 1999; Ingham et.al. 2001; Sztanderska 2005). Under 
the new conditions of labour-market participation and the existing institutional setting, 
it has become more difficult to reconcile work and family, a problem perceived mostly 
as a women’s issue.  
 
 
3.2 The labour market and the family  
3.2.1 General trends  
The labour-market situation in Poland in the first half of the 2000s was the worst in the 
EU25. The employment rate of both women and men was exceptionally low (46.2% 
and 57.2% respectively in 2004) compared to the EU25 average (70.9% for men and 
55.7% for women). In 2004 the unemployment rate was highest in the EU25 - 18% for 
men and 19.7% for women, while the EU25 average was 8.2% and 10.1%, respectively 
                                                            
16 In the period 2000–2005 the labour market remained under pressure from the increasing number of young 
people, being at the age that is extremely important as far as family formation is concerned; the labour force 
aged 20–34 increased by 621,378 people. In parallel, the size of the labour force aged 50–59 increased by 
601,077 (author’s estimates based on LFS data). It is expected that during the 2005–2010 period, the size of 
the group aged 20–34 will increase by 159,000 only (Labour Force Projections, Statistical Yearbook of 
Labour 2001, GUS, Warsaw 2002).  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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(according to Eurostat data of 2004). The most distinctive feature of the labour market, 
as mentioned previously, was a very high incidence of unemployment among young 
persons:  The unemployment rate for the 15–24 age group was 38% for men and 41.4% 
for females (the EU25 averages were 18.1% and 19.3%, respectively). Several studies 
confirm that the difficulties the younger generations are facing in the labour market 
affect  their  declining  propensity  to  start  a  family  and  to  have  a  child.  A  negative 
influence of unemployment on family formation and fertility was revealed in studies 
based on LFS data (Kocot-Górecka 2004) and other surveys (Frątczak 2003; Kotowska 
et al. 2003; Majszczyk 2005; Kotowska and Baranowska 2006).  
 
 
3.2.2 Female labour-force participation  
Under the socialist regime, women’s participation in the labour market was high. The 
wide  access  to  paid  work  for  women  resulted  mostly  from  the  labour-intensive 
economy, low productivity, and low wage policies. Low wages led to the necessity of 
having two incomes to maintain a family. Additionally, women’s economic activity was 
ideologically supported by equating emancipation with employment. The high labour-
market  participation  of  women  co-existed  with  the  traditional  model  of  the  family. 
Despite the social acceptance of the dual-earner family model, the female role was still 
perceived mainly as that of a wife and mother, while the husband’s main responsibility 
was to provide income for the family. However, the conditions of labour participation 
(a  right-to-a-job  economy,  i.e.  an  economy  with  a  job  guarantee  and  no  open 
unemployment)  as  well  as  the  provision  of  childcare  facilities  made  it  possible  for 
women to reconcile family duties and paid work. At the same time women continued to 
be mainly responsible for home and care duties (e.g., Kotowska 1995; Titkow 2001).  
This economic and ideological reasoning underpinning women's participation in 
paid work has rapidly been replaced by purely economic arguments. Moreover, it is a 
well-known  fact  that  women’s  employment  is  more  sensitive  to  declines  in  labour 
demand  related  to  output  contraction  (e.g.,  Kotowska,  1995;  Siemieńska  1997; 
Sztanderska 2005). Thus, in our opinion, structural factors played the main role in the 
deterioration of women’s position in the labour market. 
The  evident  weakening  of  women’s  position  in  the  labour  market  may  be 
illustrated by a relatively high risk of falling into unemployment, greater difficulties to 
re-enter employment, and in worsening working conditions. Women experience more 
difficulties than men do at various stages of their professional life: when starting a 
career, holding on to a job, and re-entering the labour market. The family situation has 
become more decisive for their economic activity. In the course of hiring, employers 
use the age and the family situation (the marital status, and the number and age of Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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children) as a proxy measurement for female production-related attributes. New female 
labour-market  entrants  are  exposed  to  a  higher  risk  of  falling  into  unemployment. 
Women re-entering the labour market after parental leave are confronted with serious 
obstacles to getting a job. Many studies have confirmed the discriminatory effects of 
sex as well as marital status and the presence of young children on female labour-
market  participation  (e.g.,  Steiner  and  Kwiatkowski  1995;  Puhani  1995;  Kowalska 
1996; Kotowska and Witkowski 1996; Kotowska 2001). Therefore, it can be stated that 
the  labour  market  under  transition  was  more  open  to  men  than  it  was  to  women 
(Domański 2001).  
Women  gradually  adjusted  to  the  new  conditions  of  labour-force  participation. 
Their  main  strategies  were  high  participation  in  education  and  life-long  learning, 
increasing participation in labour migration (to start education or to find a job), and 
acceptance of lower pay (Sztanderska 2005). Postponement of marriage and childbirth 
as well as a low propensity to marry and to have children may also be interpreted as 
symptoms of adjustment strategies (e.g., Kotowska and  Witkowski 1996; Kotowska 
2001).  One  may  hypothesise  that  female  employment  would  have  declined  more  if 
women  had  not  reduced  their  fertility.  Indeed,  the  analysis  of  falling  female 
employment in the years 1993-2002 decomposed by the number of children supports 
this suggestion. The average employment rate of women aged 25- 34 would have fallen 
by 5.34 percentage points instead of 1.37 if not for the reduction in fertility (Matysiak, 
2006).  Since  the  end  of  the  1990s  some  symptoms  of  relative  improvements  in 
women’s position in the labour market have been observed (Figure 18). 
Labour-market participation of females is strongly influenced by the presence of 
children, especially small children (aged 0–5 years). Moreover, the higher the number 
of children, the less likely the woman is to have a job. The negative impact children 
have on mothers’ employment in Poland is shown by several studies (e.g., Kotowska 
and Abramowska 2003, Kocot-Górecka 2004, Kotowska et al. 2005b, Matysiak 2005a, 
2005b; Matysiak, 2008, Kotowska 2006). When the children are very small (0–3 years), 
women withdraw from the labour market. When the children are older, they try to re-
enter. However, a remarkable proportion of them cannot find a job, and the percentage 
of unemployed women with children aged 3 or above increases considerably (Table 1). 
According to the survey ‘Reconciling work, family, and education’, some 54% of non-
working mothers of children aged 4–6 years cite the main reason for staying at home as 
difficulty in finding a job. 
Difficulties women are facing in the labour market result also from their dual role 
as caregivers and economic providers. The high labour-force participation of females in 
centrally planned economies has not been accompanied by changes in their social role, 
despite  their  educational  achievements.  The  economic  activity  of  women  has  been  
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Table 1:   The labour-market status of women aged 20–39 by presence and age  
  of children  
 
Percentage of women 
Age   Employed   Unemployed  Inactive  
   Without children younger than 15 
20–24  27.5  19.6  52.9 
25–29  69.2  17.7  13.1 
30–34  80.6  10.2  9.1 
35–39  75.2  12.2  12.6 
   With at least one child up to 3 years 
20–24  23.7  15.9  60.4 
25–29  38.0  11.1  50.9 
30–34  53.0  5.4  41.5 
35–39  50.9  7.8  41.3 
   With at least one child aged 3–14 
20–24  43.4  30.1  26.5 
25–29  50.4  27.6  22.0 
30–34  67.5  16.1  16.4 
35–39  70.0  14.8  15.3 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on LFS, second quarter 2005. 
 
 
externally  driven  by  demand  for  female  labour,  by  a  low  wage  policy  and  low 
productivity. However, women were mostly perceived as the secondary labour force. 
As a result, the high economic activity of females before 1989, compared  with the 
labour-force  participation  of  females  in  the  Nordic  countries,  co-existed  with  the 
patriarchal  models  and  traditional  views  on  gender  roles  prevailing  in  the  post-
communist countries. It is well known that under declining labour demand there is a 
strong preference for men to secure jobs at the cost of jobs for women in countries that 
adhere to the traditional perception of gender roles, (e.g., UNICEF 1999, Siemieńska 
1997, Kotowska 1997, 2001, Fultz et al. 2003). This finding may partly explain the 
deep decline in female employment in the course of economic transformation. 
Analyses by Matysiak (2005b), based on PPAS and LFS data, showed that in 2001 
the majority of respondents practised the ‘dual earner-female double-burden model’, 
while  most  actually  preferred  the  ‘dual  earner-dual  carer’  model.  This  discrepancy 
indicates that domestic tasks are mostly women’s responsibility, irrespective of their 
participation  in  employment.  This  conclusion  is  in  accordance  with  studies  by 
Muszyńska (2004), who argues that women in Poland are still perceived as the main 
carers compared to Western European countries. An additional argument for the still Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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strong traditional perception of women’s role is the relatively high preference given to 
the ‘sequential male breadwinner’ model (a woman should not work when children are 
small);  some  18%  of  respondents  opted  for  this  work–family  arrangement. 
Consequently,  the  male  breadwinner  model  was  the  second  most  practised  family 
model, especially by families with small children.  
 
 
3.2.3. Educational attainment  
Another important element of changes under the economic transformation is an increase 
in the significance of investment in human capital. This is a consequence of the stronger 
link  between  education  and  life  opportunities  as  well  as  the  position  in  the  labour 
market.  Economic  returns  to  education  have  strongly  increased  (e.g.  Kotowska  and 
Abramowska 2003; Sztanderska 2005; Kotowska 2006). At the same time, the changes 
to  income  distribution  that  occurred  during  the  transformation  led  to  a  shift  in 
investments in human capital (through education, health, culture and recreation) from 
investment by the state to investment by the household. Previously, the state covered 
most  of  the  related  costs.  Now,  it  is  the  household’s  responsibility,  despite  the 
limitation placed on the household to carry these costs. The limitation stems not only 
from  a  decrease  in  income  in  a  large  proportion  of  households  but  also  from  the 
marketisation of social services that contribute to a rise in the costs of human capital 
investments at the household level.  
Moreover, under the economic transformation and globalisation processes there is 
a need of simultaneous investments in human capital in both children and  adults. The 
latter need is determined by the necessary adaptation of current as well as future skills 
to  the  changes  in  the  structure  of  labour  demand  resulting  from  the  reform  of  the 
economy and technological changes.
17 The shift of investments in the human capital of 
children to the household results in an increase in the direct costs of raising children. 
The need to cover other costs associated with the education of adults (parents) leads to a 
rise in the indirect costs of raising children and to a situation where the ability to access 
high quality education services is increasingly connected to the financial situation of the 
household and its access to centres of education.  
                                                            
17 The improvement of the employment ability of the labour force was one of the fundamental conditions of 
halting and reversing a further increase in unemployment between 1998 and 2003. Opportunities for new 
generations to get appropriate education and skills useful on the labour market are strongly related to the 
development of an appropriate education system facilitating continuous improvement of adults’ skills. The 
scale of needs in this area is very large, especially if we consider the differences in education between the EU 
and Poland and the differences in education on national level by region and age (in particular, the 
discrepancies between rural and urban areas) (e.g., Jóźwiak et al. 2000).  Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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The rising educational aspirations of Poles may be illustrated by the rapid increase 
of  participation  in  university  education.  The  number  of  university  students  in  2004 
reached almost 2 million and was four times higher than in 1989. Among persons aged 
19–24, nearly 55% were in education in 2004. Labour-market indicators confirm the 
crucial role education plays in employment prospects. During the years 2000–2005, the 
labour-force  participation  rate  and  the  employment  rate  of  persons  with  university 
education (around 80% and 76%, respectively) were the only rates that did not fall. 
Moreover,  differences  in  unemployment  rates  between  persons  with  the  lowest  and 
highest education categories increased markedly – in 2005 the unemployment rate was 
25.9% for persons  with primary education and lower versus 7.3% for persons  with 
tertiary education, while in 1996 the same rates had been 12.0 and 2.9, respectively 
(LFS data from the fourth quarter).  
There are two important aspects of this improvement in educational attainment in 
Poland. Prolonged education contributes remarkably to postponement of marriage and 
parenthood.  Due  to  differences  in  educational  activities,  women  and  younger 
generations benefit more from advancement in education (Figure 19).  
 
 
3.3 Family policy  
Family policy measures are usually divided into two groups: (a) direct and indirect 
monetary transfers and (b) work and family reconciliation measures (see Hofaecker, 
2003).  Direct  transfers  include  family  and  childcare  benefits  and  subsidies  while 
indirect transfers concern tax reductions. Leave schemes and public childcare belong to 
measures oriented towards combining work and family. Eligibility conditions, coverage 
and  timing  of  the  measures  (especially  leave  schemes)  define  to  what  extent  the 
measures  support  families  in  their  parenthood  responsibilities  and  mothers’ 
involvement in the labour  market. The following short description of family policy 
regulations in Poland in the 1990s will focus on both groups of policy measures and the 
three factors mentioned above, defining their efficiency in supporting families. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s the state has reduced its support to families both 
in terms of financial measures and provision of services. Changes in direct monetary 
transfers resulted from pressure to cut overall social spending on the one hand and from 
the necessity to implement anti-poverty measures on the other. The major changes in 
family  and  childcare  benefits  implemented  in  the  period  1989–2003  can  be 
characterised as follows (Balcerzak-Paradowska et al. 2003): 
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•  Some benefits linked previously to employment (the insurance-based benefits) 
were converted into non-insurance benefits and transferred to the state budget 
or the local government.  
•   A new type of social assistance was introduced to address rising poverty. 
•  Financial support for multi-children families was expanded.  
•  The majority of family benefits (apart from maternity and childcare benefits) 
was converted from universal into income-tested benefits.  
•  Wage indexing was replaced by price indexing.  
•  More restrictive eligibility conditions were introduced. 
•  The majority of benefits decreased in real terms.  
 
Generally, the system was transformed from the universal model to one supportive 
of low-income families with children.  
 
 
Figure 19:  Percentage of persons with university education among those aged  








































Source: Author’s calculations based on LFS data from the second quarter. 
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3.3.1 Family benefits  
New arrangements for financial support to the family were defined by the reform of 
November 2003, in force since May 2004. They result in reduced financial assistance 
for  the  family  in  general  but  have  some  particular  effects  for  low-income  families, 
especially those with three or more children. Additionally, the responsibility for the 
payment  of  family  benefits  was  moved  to  social  assistance  institutions.  Since  2003 
there have been already several amendments to the new law. They resulted in a cut of 
assistance for lone parents. The most recent amendment was implemented on 18 July 
2006. It changed the income threshold for farmers’ households and increased allowance 
levels, as of 1 September 2006. 
The income criterion for basic family allowance is lower than before the 2003 
reform, i.e., the monthly household income per person should not exceed 504 PLN for 
families without disabled children (around 138 Euro, at an exchange rate of 3.65 PLN 
for 1 Euro) and 583 PLN (160 Euro) for families with disabled children up to 25 years 
of age.
18 The basic allowance was dependent on the number of children: the monthly 
amount equals 43 PLN (12 Euro) for the first and second child, 53 PLN (15 Euro) for 
the third child and 66 PLN (18 Euro) for the fourth and each subsequent child. Since 
September 2006 the basic allowance is dependent on the age of the child; the level 
increases to a monthly amount of 48 PLN (13 Euro) for a child up to 5 years, 64 PLN 
(18 Euro) for a child aged 6–18 and 68 (19 Euro) for a child aged 19–24; families with 
three or more children receive 80 PLN (22 Euro) additionally for third and subsequent 
children (if the income criterion holds).  
The basic family allowance may be increased by financial supplements, granted 
under special circumstances related to care and child-rearing (e.g., lone mothers, lone 
mothers  who  lost  their  entitlement  to  unemployment  benefit  [cancelled  in  2006], 
persons  on  parental  leave,  parents  of  disabled  children,  birth  grants,  and  nursing 
allowances).
19  There  are  also educational  supplements  for  children  attending  school 
outside the place of residence and lump sums paid once a year at the beginning of the 
school  year  for  children  from  low-income  families.  Since  the  supplements  are  all 
                                                            
18 This criterion refers to households that derive their main income from non-agriculture sources. The 
calculation of farmers’ incomes is based on the basic rate per 1 ha, which declined. From September 2006 
onwards more farmers’ families have been entitled to a basic family allowance and its financial additions.  
19 On 1 January 2006 the level of the income-tested birth grant (for those families which are entitled to the 
basic family allowance) was increased from 500 PLN (137 euro) to 1000 PLN. At the same another grant for 
a newborn baby (1000 PLN, or about 274 euro) was introduced. Families are entitled to it irrespective of 
income. The main reason behind these decisions, as declared by the government, was to diminish costs of 
raising children and to encourage couples to have children.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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income-tested (the eligibility criteria are the same as for family allowance), they are 
mostly paid to low-income families. 
In April 2005 a new supplement to the basic family allowance was introduced to 
support families with three or more children and to counteract the poverty risk, which 
increases  with  the  number  of  children.  Families  entitled  to  the  family  allowance 
received an additional 50 PLN (around 14 Euro) for the third and each subsequent 
child.  
As a result of the reform, the number of family benefit recipients in 2004 was 
lower by 7.4% than a year ago (it amounted to 5.510 million in 2004). A further decline 
was observed in 2005 (to 5.192 million).
20 The average family allowance amounted to 
46 PLN (around 13 Euro) and the average supplement to 57.7 PLN (around 16 Euro).  
This  new  system  of  financial  assistance  supports  low-income  families  with 
children  more  strongly  than  the  previous  one.  Other  families  do  not  receive  any 
significant state assistance.  
 
 
3.3.2 Childcare  
Moreover, the state delegated responsibility  for running  childcare institutions to the 
local authorities. Due to financial shortages, they moved some costs of running the 
public childcare institutions (about 30–40%) to parents in the form of increased fee for 
meals,  charges  for  services  beyond  the  minimum  educational  program,  and 
contributions  to  parents’  committee  funds  (Balcerzak-Paradowska  et  al.  2003).  Any 
additional  educational  and  recreations  services  (foreign  languages,  music  lessons, 
swimming pool, sport activities, etc.) now have to be paid as an extra. Also, in primary 
schools any care services provided for small children are no longer free of charge. In 
sum, institutional care for children aged 0–6 and for those of primary school age was 
radically  reduced,  the  costs  of  services  have  increased,  while  accessibility  to  the 
services declined. Over the years 1989–2003, the number of places in crèches declined 
by 76% and by 25% in nursery schools (CSO data). The indicators for children under 
institutional care belong to the lowest group compared to other EU countries (Matysiak 
2005b). In 2004 only 2% of children aged 0–2 attended crèches, while 38% of children 
aged  3–5  attended  kindergartens.  Finally,  no  childcare  subsidies  are  offered  to 
families.
21 
                                                            
20 Ministry of Labour and Social Policy data.  
21 According to the CSO data, around 5% of children aged 0–2 attended crèches in the 1980s, while the 
percentage of children aged 3–6 in kindergartens oscillated between 34.8% and 36.4%. In the 1990s the 
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3.3.3 Maternity leave  
Maternity leave is granted to a female employee in the case of childbirth and to those 
who adopt children or provide foster care. The wage loss is fully compensated. Before 
1999 the length of maternity leave was 16 weeks upon first birth (since 2001, it can be 
divided into 14 weeks for the mother and two for the father), 18 weeks upon each 
successive birth (14 weeks for the mother and four for the father), and 26 weeks in the 
case  of  multiple  birth.  Since  1999  there  have  been  some  temporary  changes  in  the 
duration of the leave. In 1999 it was extended to 20 weeks upon the first and each 
successive birth and 30 in the case of multiple births, and in 2001 to 26 and 39 weeks, 
respectively.  In  2002  the  leave  was  cut  back  to  pre-1999  levels.  Recently,  the 
government has prepared a proposal to extend it again.  
 
 
3.3.4 Parental leave  
Another reconciliation measure is parental leave. It may be taken for 36 months in four 
periods at most for a child up to the age of four by employees with a work record of at 
least 6 months. This may be extended for another 36 months if the employee is raising a 
child who is disabled, chronically ill, or mentally retarded and requires care. The leave 
is granted until the child reaches the age of 18 at the latest.  
The total standard leave of 36 months is assigned to parents (or persons who take 
care of a child), and either the mother or father may take the leave. The time for both 
parents to be jointly on leave cannot exceed three months. Fathers have been entitled to 
parental  leave  since  1996.
22  There  are  gender  equality  guarantees  on  stability  of 
employment  relations,  on  the  return  to  work  to  an  equivalent  position  and  on  the 
inclusion  of  the  leave  period  as  part  of  the  total  work  record  (for  pension  rights). 
Additionally, there is an opportunity to combine work, training, education, and parental 
leave if these activities allow  for the child/children to be taken care of – the  main 
purpose of the leave.  
Since 2004, persons who start a job while on parental leave lose their parental 
benefit, irrespective of the income criterion. The parental benefit is means-tested – the 
monthly household income per capita cannot exceed 504 PLN (583 PLN in the case of 
a disabled child). Previously, it was possible to work and receive the parental benefit at 
                                                                                                                                               
former declined to 2%, contrary to the childcare indicator for children aged 3–6, where the percentage 
increased from 32.8 to 40.4 in 2003 due to a declining number of births.  
22 The right to family benefits and leave schemes was extended to include fathers but it was not individualised 
i.e. it was considered as a family entitlement to be used by parents.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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the same time when the total income of the parent on leave did not exceed 60% of the 
monthly average remuneration in the national economy. 
The parental leave scheme in Poland has been subjected to some criticism for its 
inflexibility (Matysiak 2005b). This inflexibility has been moderated by an option to 
replace the leave by part-time employment (since 2002), to divide it into four periods 
(since  2003),  and  to  undertake  any  professional  or  educational  activities  during  the 
leave (since 2003). However, these possibilities are hardly used. One of the reasons 
might be the tight income criterion for the parental benefit. One may also argue that a 
flat-rate parental benefit may affect the leave take-up rate by fathers. Since the father’s 
income  is  usually  higher  than  that  of  the  mother,  the  family’s  welfare  deteriorates 
further when the leave is taken by the father. Recently collected data confirm that 50% 
of mothers but only 2.5% of fathers entitled to parental leave made use of it between the 
second quarter of 2004 and the second quarter of 2005. Parental benefit was paid to 
nearly 70% women, more frequently to mothers in rural areas. The higher the education 
level, the lower the share of benefit receivers. Lone mothers made use of that leave 
slightly  more  frequently.  Additionally,  the  data  in  Table  2  suggest  that  not  only 
financial reasons (e.g., a lack of parental benefit, a benefit that is too low) but also 
concerns about negative effects for employment and preference for work are decisive as 
to parental leave take-up.  
 
 
Table 2:  Reasons for not taking up parental leave  
 
 Reasons   Total Females Males
No benefit /too low*  22.1  29.6  14.3 
No flexibility to choose the leave period   2.3  2.1  2.3 
Negative effects for social insurance   1.3  1.2  1.6 
Negative effects for employment    16.9  19.8  14.3 
Preference for work due to other reasons   16.7  17.3  16.0 
Other reasons   40.7  30.0  51.5 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey ‘Reconciling work and family’, second quarter 2005 
*400 PLN per month (around 110 Euro monthly up to two years). 
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3.3.5 Part-time employment  
Part-time  employment  is  not  a  typical  family  policy  measure.  However,  it  is 
increasingly taken into account in discussions on women’s employment, fertility, and 
the welfare state.  
Part-time employment is very limited in Poland. Slightly more women than men 
work half-time: 13% versus 8% in 2004 (LFS data). Women with a higher education 
opt for part-time jobs less frequently. Those with the lowest education do not perceive 
part-time work as a measure to combine work and family either, probably due to low 
pay (World Bank 2004). Part-time work in Poland is rather an alternative for those who 
cannot find a full-time job, i.e., they engage in this form of employment involuntarily 
(around  30%  of  part-timers)  than  a  reconciliation  measure  for  those  who  need  to 
combine work and care (Matysiak 2005a).  
The  scarce  provision  of  childcare  facilities,  availability  of  leave  schemes, 
underdeveloped flexible work patterns, and part-time employment on a limited scale 
constitute the ‘imposed home care’  model of family policy in Poland (Kontula and 
Metinnen 2005). This means that employed parents have to rely mostly on their own 
involvement and support of relatives to care for the children. The results of the  survey  
‘Reconciliation of work and family’ carried out in May 20005 showed that nearly 40% 
of working mothers of children of up to 14 years of age and living with partners were 
supported  by  relatives  providing  childcare.  Support  by  household  members  is 
particularly important for single mothers (Table 3). Working mothers with a university 
education used child day-care centres relatively more often.  
 
 
Table 3:  Employed parents of children aged up to 14 by care arrangements*  
 
Care arrangements   Total Fathers  Mothers  Lone parents 
Public care centres   16 .4 13 .7  19 .6  20 .7 
Private care centres  0 .6 0 .5  0 .7  0 .0 
Paid care   1 .8 1 .5  2 .2  0 .8 
Partner  34 .2 47 .7  19 .4  –
Relatives – members of the same 
households   17 .8 12 .9  22 .0  40 .1 
Relatives – living in other households  14 .2 11 .6  17 .8  14 .0 
Friends  0 .5 0 .4  0 .7  1 .2 
No use of any care   14 .6 11 .6  17 .8  22 .3 
Total  100 .0 100 .0  100 .0  100 .0 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey “Reconciliation of work and family”, second quarter 2005. 
*percentage of respondents who use the defined form of care while at work. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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4. Remarks on ideational change  
Despite the declining propensity for marriage and childrearing in Poland, family life 
and children are highly valued, and marriage remains the main form within which to 
start a family. Various survey-based studies still confirm the high importance attached 
to the family with children and based on marriage.
23 However, although a family with 
children remains the main choice among many life-style options, alternative life courses 
have been accepted and practised by an increasing number of people, especially by 
younger generations who are more receptive to recent economic and social changes. 
Gradually progressing changes in values and beliefs are reflected in intergenerational 
differences: Younger generations are less altruistic, more inclined to strive for self-
fulfilment and appreciation outside the family, and they are more inclined to attach less 
importance to family life and children (Kowalska and Wróblewska, 2008). 
The foregoing discussion about family-related behaviours in Poland has shown 
that in very recent years some changes accelerated (e.g., marriage dissolution, out-of-
wedlock births) and are more progressed among the urban population. Hence, one may 
hypothesise that changes in values and norms are more apparent for that population. To 
identify ideational change behind both components of the overall observed changes 
selected, we refer to the results of two retrospective surveys carried out in 2001 and 
2006. Our focus is on values attached to the family and its formation, secularisation, 
and contraception. The main data refer to the sample of urban population, aged 18–54, 
residing in towns with a least 20,000 inhabitants (Frątczak and Balicki 2003; Frątczak 
et al. 2006; Jóźwiak 2006).  
Despite the fact that in Poland marriage is still the prevailing form of union, the 
level of acceptance for cohabitation has increased significantly. In 2001 as many as 
almost  12%  of  men  and  more  than  16%  of  women  expressed  the  opinion  that 
cohabitation was not acceptable at all, while in 2006 the corresponding figures were 6% 
and 8%, respectively. What is important from the perspective of future demographic 
behaviour is that such an opinion was indicated by only 4% of respondents aged below 
30 years and by 4.5% of respondents with higher education. Simultaneously, around 
48% of respondents in 2001 and 57% of respondents in 2006 accepted cohabitation as a 
proper form of union under the condition that it suits both partners.  
                                                            
23 Frątczak and Balicki (2003) provide analyses based on the retrospective survey on family-related attitudes 
and behaviour of young and medium-age females and males in Poland in 2001; Kotowska et al. (2003) refer 
to the national PPAS of 2001; Kajcińska (2005) makes use of the data of the third wave of the European 
Values Study; Esveldt and Fokkema (2005) use the international PPAS data similarly to Sobotka and Testa 
(2008), Stankuniene and Maslauskaite (2008), Kowalska and Wróblewska (2008). Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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On the one hand, such level of cohabitation acceptance seems to be relatively low, 
regardless  of  the  upward  trend  in  respective  proportions.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
relatively high and increasing percentage of ‘conditional supporters’ seems to indicate 
at least an increasing tolerance towards consensual unions.  
In 2001 as well as in 2006 respondents expressed very positive opinions on having 
children; some aspects of parenthood were perceived even more positively in 2006 than 
in 2001. On the basis of the two surveys, neither a decrease in the value of children and 
family  nor  any  lowering  of  their  position  in  the  individual  value  systems  of  the 
respondents can be observed. There is, however, a notable increase in the proportion of 
respondents who believe that parents should not make sacrifices for their children and 
that a couple should remain childless if they preferred to do so for their own comfort. 
This is a symptom of increasing individualism and orientation towards self–fulfilment.  
In  the  context  of  the  value  of  children  and  family,  opinions  on  the  statement, 
‘Marriage cannot be complete without children’ look interesting. In 2001, some 50.5% 
of respondents agreed or fully agreed with this statement, while in 2006 this proportion 
increased  to  56%.  The  view  was  expressed  relatively  less  frequently  by  younger 
respondents (below 30 years of age) but the relevant proportion increased as well (from 
45% to 48%). 
The extent of secularisation in Poland is not large, although in 2006 the percentage 
of respondents who declared themselves as being of ’no denomination’ were three times 
the  2001  proportion  (1%  and  3%  of  respondents,  respectively).  In  this  period,  the 
religiosity of Poles weakened, as measured by a self–classification of respondents into 
one  of  10  categories  of  religious  practise.  The  proportion  of  regularly  practicing 
believers decreased from 38% in 2001 to 26% in 2006 among men and from 50% to 
34% among women. However, the share of believers practicing irregularly increased 
from 55.5% to 63.5% among men and from 47% to 59% among women. In general, the 
share of practicing believers (both regular and irregular) decreased by 4 percentage 
points between 2001 and 2006.  
The process of attitude change of Poles towards religion can be described as  ‘de–
institutionalisation’ and ‘individualisation’ of confession or religion  more so than a 
’secularisation’  (Mariański  2007).  The  trend  is  manifested  in  declining  church 
attendance, a weakening of feelings of ties with the church as an institution, and an 
increasing propensity for individual interpretations of norms and values formulated by 
the church. The importance of religion is still very high – though decreasing – for all 
respondents, including respondents under 30. In this group, religion was very important 
for 78% of respondents in 2001 and 69% of respondents in 2006 (Frątczak et al. 2006). 
The Catholic Church is still an important institution, with the highest ranks of social 
trust; however, its influence on people’s behaviour is gradually weakening (Mariański 
2007).  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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According to the SDT concept, the prevalence of modern, effective contraceptives 
plays a very important role as a ‘technological’ factor in reducing fertility. The more 
effective  use  of  contraception  is  often  singled  out  as  important  for  fertility  decline 
(Jaruga  1999;  Bolesławski  2001;  Frątczak  1999;  Frątczak  and  Balicki  2003).  Such 
effects seem to be indicated in analyses by Bolesławski (2001), which revealed that the 
percentage of marriages with a pregnant bride decreased significantly (from 47% to 
38% between 1989 and 2000) and that the number of children born within marriage but 
conceived before marriage has also decreased, particularly for women under 25 years of 
age. This decline contributes to the reduction in the propensity to marry. Observations 
about  the  more  widespread  use  of  contraception  and  shifts  towards  modern 
contraceptives is confirmed by studies on the sexual behaviour of the young and older 
generations  (Wróblewska  1998;  Woynarowska  2007;  Izdebski  2007;  Frątczak  et  al. 
2006) and by studies on fertility control (e.g. Szamotowicz 2007).  
FFS data for Poland from 1991 showed that 49.4% of couples did not use any 
method,  19.3%  practised  periodic  abstinence,  9.1%  used  condoms,  11.1%  used 
withdrawal, and only 2.3% used the pill (female sample, Holzer and Kowalska 1997). 
Data from a special survey on the use of contraceptives, run in 2005, indicates that the 
main  contraceptives  used  were  condoms  (36%  of  respondents)  and  the  pill  (24%). 
Natural methods were used by 16% of women (Woynarowska and Tabak 2007). A 
similar  pattern  of  contraception  was  found  for  a  non-random  sample  of  mothers 
employed in sectors other than agriculture who produced a child during the years 1995–
2004. Data from the survey carried out in November–December 2006 among mothers 
residing predominantly in urban regions showed that contraceptives most in use before 
the last pregnancy were condom (30% of mothers), the pill (23%), and natural methods 
(23%) (Kotowska et al. 2007).  
The  growing  use  of  contraception  is  combined  with  a  shift  towards  modern 
methods.  However,  despite  the  increasing  use  of  the  pill,  especially  among  young 
women, the highest percentage of females made use of a condom (e.g. Szamotowicz 
2007; Woynarowska 2007; Izdebski 2007). 
The change in contraception practices is confirmed by the retrospective survey 
data  of  2001  and  2006:  Among  respondents  younger  than  30  years,  unconditional 
acceptance of using contraceptives increased to 70% of men and women in 2006 (from 
66% of women and 60% of men in 2001). However, the analysis of opinions in the two 
surveys reveals a relatively high proportion of respondents for whom the reliance on 
contraceptives was unacceptable (around 9% in 2001 and 8.5% in 2006). For younger 
respondents, this percentage is lower and shows a slight decrease over the period 2001–
2006 for women (from 5.8% to 4.7%) but an increase among men (from 4.5% to 6.5%) 
(Frątczak et al. 2006).  Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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Another indication of shifts in birth control behaviour is a decline in adolescent 
fertility despite the decreasing age of sexual initiation and in spite of the increasing 
acceptance of sexual intercourse outside marriage. The birth rate dropped from 30.7 
births per 1000 of women aged 15-19 years in 1989 to 13.8 in 2004 which situates 
Poland among the CEE countries with the lowest teenage fertility (Wróblewska 1998, 
2007).  
In any debate on birth control, one has to refer to the regulation of abortion. Since 
1993 induced abortion has been restricted in Poland except for three situations: When 
the  health  or  life  of  a  pregnant  woman  is  endangered,  when  prenatal  tests  indicate 
irreversible disability of the fetus, or when the pregnancy results from legally prohibited 
sexual contact and intercourse forced upon a woman. 
The decline in induced and spontaneous abortions was observed as early as before 
1993. According to registration data, the number of induced abortions declined from 
138,000 in 1980 to 35,000 in 1989 and 4,500 in 1992. Spontaneous abortions dropped 
from around 70,000 in 1980 to 52,000 in 1989. Their number oscillated between 41,000 
and 47,000 in the years 1994–2004. Estimates of illegal abortions differ remarkably, 
from 10,000 to 170,000 (Niemiec 2007). Analyses by Jaruga (1999) seem to confirm 
that abortion cannot be considered as a factor contributing to fertility decline in Poland 
before or after 1989.  
Other studies also show progressing changes in sexual behaviours and methods to 
control  fertility.  They  reveal  an  increasing  acceptance  of  sexual  contacts  outside 
marriage, a decrease in the link between sexual behaviour and the decision to marry, 
and a lower age at sexual initiation (e.g., Wróblewska 1998; Woynarowska 2007). 
To conclude, the results presented demonstrate slight changes in values and norms 
related to family and children in Poland. They are more visible among younger persons. 
The  upward  trends  in  divorces,  one-parent  families,  and  the  decline  in  births  were 
perceived  negatively  by  more  than  70%  of  Poles,  while  other  family-related 
developments, such as the increasing proportion of cohabiting couples and the rising 
proportion  of  out-of-wedlock  births  and  childlessness  received  less  disapproval 
(Kotowska et al. 2003).   Therefore, one can expect further developments in the direction 
indicated by the SDT. However, currently it can be said that the ideational change in 
Poland is relatively slow.  
 
 
5. Policy measures intended to reverse the declining fertility in 
Poland  
It is striking that Poland, where family and children are highly valued, has one of the 
lowest  fertility  rates  in  Europe.  Although  there  is  a  lot  of  uncertainty  about  future Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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childbearing intentions of the childless, there exist large discrepancies between values 
attached to children and family life and procreative behaviours. This issue needs to be 
explained. One possible interpretation is that these discrepancies are affected by the 
restrictions people face. Due to the  state’s  withdrawal from family support and the 
difficulties experienced in the labour market by particular population groups, the lack of 
resources available to individuals and families increasingly restricts their capabilities to 
cope with family responsibilities.  
Several  studies  confirm  the  relevance  of  economic  determinants  related  to  the 
costs  of  raising  children  and  the  labour  market  for  the  family  and  parenthood. 
According to the two nationally representative surveys, carried out in the second half of 
2001  in  Poland,  the  main  reasons  to  postpone  marriage  and  childbearing  were 
difficulties in finding a job and poor dwelling conditions. Less important was the need 
of  young  people  for  increasing  independence,  a  longer  period  of  education,  and  a 
decreasing importance of marriage (Frątczak and Balicki 2003; Kotowska et al. 2003). 
Having a job and a relatively stable position in the labour market was indicated as a 
precondition to family formation. Analyses based on LFS data showed that in the years 
1992–2002  the  correlation  between  marital  status  and  employment  changed,  which 
seems  to  account  for  the  sequence  of  education–employment–marriage  adopted  by 
women. In 1992 married females less frequently had a job than single females and were 
slightly more exposed to unemployment. Within the period of economic transformation, 
married women gradually improved their position in the labour market such that, by 
2002, they had a considerably higher probability of employment and a lower probability 
of unemployment than single females (Kotowska and Abramowska 2003). The logistic 
regression  run  on  the  LFS  data  of  2005  confirmed  that  change.  Moreover,  married 
women with children were more exposed to unemployment than single women without 
children  and  less  exposed  than  lone  mothers.  Simultaneously,  married  women  with 
children  had  a  significantly  lower  probability  of  employment  than  single  females 
without children and they had a higher probability of employment than lone mothers 
(Kotowska 2006). 
The most relevant determinants for limiting the number of children were the costs 
of raising children and an uncertain future for children. The costs of raising children 
were especially important for persons aged 20–29, people with a low education, and 
married  couples  (parents).  Concerns  about  the  future  of  children  were  expressed 
markedly by persons aged 25–34 and those with a low educational level (Kotowska et 
al. 2003). Childless respondents aged 20–40 indicated a lack of partner and expressed 
concerns about the future of children as the most important reasons to remain childless. 
Parents at that age group declared an uncertain future for children and high costs of 
children as decisive for the  decision  not to  have an additional child (Fokkema and 
Esveldt  2005).  Also,  the  results  of  the  reconciliation  survey  of  May  2005  again Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
842    http://www.demographic-research.org 
indicated the costs of children influence parenthood intentions; additional reasons were 
related  to  employment  (difficulties  in  reconciling  employment  and  parenthood, 
concerns about continuing work after parental leaves). Moreover, logistic regressions 
run  for  negative  intentions  to  become  a  parent  contrasted  with  positive  intentions 
confirmed the results obtained by Sobotka and Testa for Poland (Sobotka and Testa, 
2008): Low education level considerably restricted plans to have a child for childless 
men. For childless women such a limiting factor was non-participation in the labour 
market (Kotowska and Baranowska 2006). Additionally, male unemployment increased 
the  risk  of  childlessness.  In  the  models  explaining  uncertainty  about  a  transition  to 
parenthood compared with specified fertility intentions, as in regressions by Sobotka 
and Testa, being single strongly determined the uncertainty of intentions.  
Referring to the resources-restrictions-behaviour approach (Hoffman-Nowotny and 
Fux 2001), one may conclude that possible policy recommendations should focus on 
measures that support individuals and families in building their own resources and that 
reduce  restrictions  related  to  family  formation  and  childbearing  decisions.  And 
measures aimed at reconciliation of work and family commitments have double effects 
–  they  strengthen  the  resources  of  individuals  and  families  as  well  as  weaken 
constraints.  
Reconciliation is a key issue in debates on fertility and family since the increasing 
economic participation of women results not only from changes in their social roles but 
also changes in demand for their labour. Recently, female employment acquired a new 
rationale. Challenged by the shrinking labour force as well as the rapid ageing of the 
population and work force which are taking place under the pressure of globalisation 
and technological change, Europe is searching for solutions to increase its development 
potential. A rise in women’s employment is indicated as one of the primary targets to be 
achieved. Additionally, rising uncertainty in the labour market prompts the need for 
dual earning to diversify risks related to deterioration of family  welfare due to job 
losses. Also, the implementation of the defined contribution pension scheme, based on 
individual  accounts  of  workers
24  creates  new  incentives  for  women’s  employment, 
since  future  old-age  pensions  are  strongly  determined  by  labour-market  experience. 
However, more women in paid employment could have a negative effect on fertility, 
already at a low level (e.g. Kotowska et al. 2005). The challenge to combine increases 
in  fertility  and  women’s  employment  is  even  stronger  in  countries  such  as  Poland, 
where low employment coexists with lowest-low fertility and where the perception of 
                                                            
24 The reform of the pension system took place in Poland in 1998. Its main feature was a gradual replacement 
of the old pay-as you-go (PAYG) system by the defined contribution system. In other words the system in 
which current contributions are used to pay the expenses for the current old-age pensioners has been gradually 
replaced by the system based on individual accounts.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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gender  roles  is  still  traditional,  although  gender  equality  is  starting  to  be  slowly 
recognized as an issue in public debates.  
Additionally, economic globalisation, the restructuring of labour markets, and new 
technologies create major new conditions for actors of economic and societal change, 
among other conditions for individuals and families, employees and employers, various 
institutions, and the state. According to Mills (2001), McDonald (2002), and Mills and 
Blossfeld (2005) these developments may be labelled as family and child–unfriendly 
(e.g., Kotowska 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b). Pressures on increasing labour-market 
flexibility as well as unstable and discontinuous employment require more individual 
effort and time to be managed. These pressures lead to the growing incompatibility of 
family with labour-market participation as well as to rising uncertainty in the labour 
market.  
Solutions that facilitate a combination of parenthood and work should be seen as 
preconditions  for  fertility  increase.  However,  their  effectiveness  depends  on  the 
conceptualisation of women’s (mothers’) employment. And it is increasingly held that 
employment–family reconciliation solutions should be parent-oriented instead of only 
women-oriented (e.g., Leira 2002; Letablier 1998). Therefore, debates on reconciliation 
measures  should  include  the  issue  of  gender  equality.  The  issue  is  increasingly 
important since in many countries rising female labour-force participation has not been 
accompanied by changing perceptions of their social roles or by implementing policy 
measures that account for the dual role of women as earners and care-givers. Liefbroer 
and Corijn (1999) refer to the former as a ‘cultural incompatibility’ between family and 
women’s  work,  and  to  the  latter  as  a  ‘structural  incompatibility’.  The  concept  of 
structural incompatibility between employment and family reflects, in fact, a kind of a 
structural  lag  in  adapting  the  institutional  setting  to  the  increasing  labour-force 
participation of women. Thus, in Poland as in other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (‘the CEE countries’), there is a strong cultural conflict, accompanied by the 
rising structural incompatibility between work and family which began in the 1990s 
(Muszyńska 2004, 2005). 
Analyses  of  fertility  differentials  in  Europe  in  the  context  of  gender  roles  and 
actual societal opportunities and constraints on the roles of women as an economic 
provider and home-carer showed that higher social approval for women’s work and 
lower  structural  incompatibility  were  associated  with  lower  opportunity  costs  and 
higher  fertility  levels  (Adsera  2004;  Muszyńska  2005).  As  cultural  incompatibility 
reduces the impact of reconciliation policies on the labour-participation of mothers, one 
cannot  neglect  the  cultural  component  in  policy  recommendations.  Policies  that 
diminish the traditional perception of gender roles by promoting equality between men 
and  women are assumed to strengthen reconciliation  measures already implemented 
(e.g., by encouraging fathers to use existing regulations on parental leaves for men and Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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to take advantage of flexible working hours or part-time work when caring for small 
children, etc.). The promotion of equal opportunities for employment and equality in 
family responsibilities seems to have a special relevance in Poland, as in other post-
socialist countries with a high cultural incompatibility between family and work (e.g., 
Philipov 2005a, 2005b; Kotowska and Matysiak, 2008). 
To sum  up, policy  measures needed to reverse downward trends in  fertility  in 
Poland are in line with suggestions by McDonald (2002) and Gauthier (2005). The 
proposed ranking is as follows:  
 
1.  Support for parents to combine work and family, including gender equality. 
2.  Financial support to families. 
3.  Developing family and child–friendly societies. 
 
Among  the  reconciliation  measures  discussed  under  family  policy  in  Poland 
(institutional  childcare,  leave  schemes),  primary  importance  should  be  given  to 
increasing the accessibility of childcare services (nurseries and kindergartens) in terms 
of places and costs as well as the development of care activities for schoolchildren.  
Childcare facilities of good quality available at reasonable prices and time adjusted to 
working  schedules  of  parents  can  be  considered  as  a  policy  measure  aimed  at 
decreasing both costs of raising children at the family level and educational inequalities. 
The latter is related to rising income diversification and increasing costs of education. 
Additionally,  childcare  provision  for  schoolchildren  should  be  extended.  These 
developments would have a double employment effect: Mothers would stay in work 
and  additional  jobs  in  services  would  be  created.  The  next  important  measures  are 
flexible working arrangements for parents and part-time employment. A higher reliance 
on  them,  however,  requires  greater  organisational  efforts  by  employers.  Monetary 
transfers to families need to be rearranged as well, i.e. they cannot be considered as 
anti-poverty measures only. There is also the suggestion to place a greater emphasis on 
indirect transfers (e.g. tax reductions). There is no direct family-related tax system; 
however,  several  measures  could  be  considered  as  indirectly  family-friendly:  the 
potential for joint returns by spouses, a potential for single parents to use rules similar 
to those for married couples, tax relief with respect to various benefits and financial 
assistance. Some indications of family support changes in the tax system already exist. 
From 2007 income tax is reduced for families with three or more children irrespective 
of their income. Criticism has already been raised on its limited coverage – tax relief 
should be proposed for all families with children. 
The  survey  data  confirm  the  relevance  of  the  suggested  direction  of  change. 
According to the reconciliation survey of 2005, flexible work arrangements were hardly 
used by employees for reconciliation purposes. Part-time work was mostly a demand-
driven measure. When asked for policy measures that  would influence child-related Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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decisions,  women  who  were  uncertain  about  their  fertility  intentions  identified  the 
following as the most important (Baranowska, 2007):  
 
•  increasing accessibility of childcare services (nurseries and kindergartens, 
arrangements  for  school-age  children)  in  terms  of  places  and  costs  – 
between 53% and 61% of women declared these measures as important or 
very important; 
•  flexible working arrangements (the possibility to adjust working hours and 
to work at home) and part-time work – between 55% and 62% of women 
indicated these measures as important or very important;  
•  childcare support by family members and financial support by the state – 
indicated by slightly more than 50% of women.  
 
Also,  experts  asked  under  the  Delphi  study  about  future  policy  scenarios  for 
Poland concurred that reconciliation measures, gender equity, and tax reduction need to 
be implemented (Kotowska et al. 2005a). 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
The objective of this contribution was to describe the main changes in family formation 
processes in Poland as well as their possible determinants. To this end, we used the 
conceptual framework of the SDT with a focus on its structural component. We adopted 
this framework mainly because of the similarity of family developments in Poland to 
processes observed under the SDT in other European countries, particularly in terms of 
the main directions of change: the declining propensity to marry and to have children as 
well  as  the  postponement  of  both  decisions.  However,  one  can  also  point  to  some 
dissimilarities. And the question arises whether the SDT can be used appropriately to 
explain  family-related  developments  in  Poland  since  ideational  change  has  not 
advanced  until  recently  compared  with  its  progress  in  other  European  countries. 
Moreover, structural processes differ from those observed in the 1960s and 1970s in 
‘western’ Europe due to economic and political reforms – the main driving force for 
changes in demographic behaviour. But the main direction of change, i.e. modernisation 
and development of the post-industrial economy, is the same. We have thus used the 
concept of the SDT as a kind of ‘reference framework’ to analyse possible factors of 
fertility reduction in Poland. 
Taking into account the three main components of modernisation processes (i.e. 
structure, culture, technology) and their possible impacts on family changes under the 
SDT, we would argue that for the demographic behaviour observed in the 1990s the Kotowska et al.: Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes 
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structural component played a much more important role both in terms of economic 
restrictions and incentives than it did in developed economies. However, with time, 
changes  in  values  and  norms  are  assumed  to  become  more  relevant  for  people’s 
preferences and life choices. Consequently, the results presented here show differences 
between younger (especially the under-30s) and older generations.  
Among  the  structure-related  processes,  which  cover  economic  developments, 
labour-market participation, household welfare, and social policies, our focus was on 
labour-market  changes  and  family  policies  since  they  play  a  decisive  role  in  the 
increasing direct and indirect costs of raising children. Moreover, the labour market in 
Poland,  as  in  other  countries,  is  becoming  increasingly  affected  by  globalisation 
processes, which lead to family-unfriendly developments. Unstable and discontinuous 
employment,  which  requires  greater  management  of  individual  effort  and  time, 
expectations that employees will be highly available and mobile increase work–family 
incompatibilities  and  affect  family-related  decisions  (e.g.  Mills  2001;  Mills  and 
Blossfeld 2005; Kotowska 2004b, 2005b). Also, the growing uncertainty about jobs and 
incomes contributes to difficulties concerning decisions on long-lasting commitments, 
like family formation and (particularly) parenthood. Reconciliation between work and 
family is becoming crucial, especially in countries such as Poland where low levels of 
women’s employment co-exist with the lowest-low fertility, the traditional perception 
of  gender  roles  is  still  held  by  a  substantial  part  of  the  population,  and 
underdevelopment of flexible work patterns and institutional childcare makes work and 
family responsibilities hard to combine.  
In  the  period  under  study,  changes  in  family  policies  did  not  mitigate  the 
difficulties  that  families  were  facing,  which  were  those  related  predominantly  to 
economic change and the labour market. Social policy (and family policy) has been 
formulated in terms of reaction to immediate social needs (unemployment, poverty) 
with  measures  concentrated  on  income  support  for  dependent  population  strata. 
Increasing uncertainty and incompatibility between employment and family have been 
neglected in designing policies. As a result, the increasing vulnerability of the family is 
accompanied  by  a  weakening  intervention  of  the  state.  Therefore,  family  related 
behaviour seems to reflect mostly people’s adaptations to new conditions. On the one 
hand, it seems that ‘adjustments under pressure’ as well as the importance of religion 
and the position of the church slow down value changes. On the other hand, however, 
these changes do progress gradually and the impact of the church is weakened by the 
‘de-institutionalisation’ and ‘individualisation’ of religion.  
There is no doubt that under new economic and political regimes the role of the 
state is subjected to change. However, reducing the role of the state in Poland has not 
solely  resulted  from  a  redefinition  of  its  position  and  rapidly  diminishing  state 
resources.  The  main  reason  is  a  lack  of  ideas  on  how  to  respond  to  new  social Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 22 
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challenges  emerging  under  transformation  and  additionally  strengthened  by 
technological  change  and  globalisation.  Furthermore,  under  strong,  steady  pressure 
from unemployment, traditional perceptions of gender role have been re-voiced. The 
change  in  the  family  situation  in  the  1990s  can  be  treated  as  a  shift  from 
‘defamilisation’ towards ‘familisation’ of child-related duties (Leira 2002; Kotowska 
2004) or to the ‘imposed home care’ model of family policy (Kontula and Miettinen 
2005). Without reversing that shift, it is difficult to expect a fertility recovery in Poland 
even under improving conditions of household welfare.  
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